from Atty. Daye

This is an article posted by my ever beautiful professor in undergrad Atty. Daye Tolentino in her blog 'Dayedalera' last year July 22, 2008. Here is the site so that you can check it out:

http://anneclaudette.blogspot.com/

HUMAN RELATIONS

1. Principle of Abuse of Rights (Art. 19, NCC)

Elements:
(a) Legal right or duty
(b) The right or duty is exercised in bad faith, and
(c) For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

ABUSE OF RIGHT

Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student’s grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course. (University of the East vs. Romeo A. Jader, GR. No. 132344 [2000])

For the pivotal factor rendering Philamgen and the other private respondents liable in damages is that the termination by them of the General Agency Agreement was tainted with bad faith. Hence, if a principal acts in bad faith and with abuse of right in terminating the agency, then he is liable in damages. This is in accordance with the precepts of Human Relations enshrined in our Civil Code that every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith (Art. 19, Civil Code), and every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damages to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same (Art. 20, Civil Code). (Arturo P. Valenzuela, et al. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., GR. No. 83122 [1990])

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfil that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. (Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Marilou T. Gonzales, GR. No. 97336 [1993])


SEDUCTION

The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter’s family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affair reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese National. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through cleaver strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code. (Cecilio Pe, et al. vs. Alfonso Pe, GR. No. L-17396 [1962])


2. General Sanction (Art. 20, NCC)
Speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction

Elements:
(a) In the exercise of his legal right or duty
(b) Willfully or negligently causes damage to another

3. Acts Contra Bonus Mores (Art. 21, NCC)

Elements:
(a) There is an act which is legal
(b) But which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy
(c) And it is done with intent to injure

PUBLIC HUMILIATION

The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Private respondent has to take full responsibility for his act and his claim that he was unaware of what he had done to petitioner because of drunkenness is definitely no excuse and does not relieve him of his liability to the latter. (Rafael Patricio vs. The Honorable Oscar Leviste, GR. No. 51832 [1989])

We do not lay down here any hard-and-fast rule as to what act or combination of acts constitute the crime of shoplifting for it must be stressed that each case must be considered and adjudged on a case-to-case basis and that in the determination of whether a person suspected of shoplifting has in truth and in fact committed the same, all the attendant facts and circumstances should be considered in their entirety and not from any single fact or circumstance from which to impute the stigmata of shoplifting on any person suspected and apprehended therefor.

Upon the facts and under the law, plaintiff has clearly made the cause of action for damages against the defendants. Defendants wilfully caused loss or injury to plaintiff in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, making them amenable to damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. That private respondent was falsely accused of shoplifting is evident. (Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs. Jose J. Espino, Jr., GR. No. L-48250 [1979])


4. Violation of Right of Privacy, Family Relations, Vexation and Humiliation (Art. 26, NCC)

5. Dereliction of Official Duty of Public Officers (Art. 27, NCC)

Requisites:
(a) defendant is a public officer charged with the performance of a duty in favor of the plaintiff
(b) he refused or neglected without just cause to perform such duty (ministerial)
(c) plaintiff sustained material or moral loss as consequence of such non-performance
(d) the amount of such damages, if material

6. Unfair Competition (Art. 28, NCC)

7. Malicious Prosecution
Action for damages brought by one against another whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceedings has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or proceeding in favor of the defendant therein

Elements:
(a) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal
(b) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause
(c) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice

8. Violation of Rights and Liberties of Another Person (Art. 32, NCC)

VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT AGAINST SEARCHES AND SEIZURE

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safe guards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. (Rogelio Aberca, et al. vs. Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., GR. No. L-69866 [1988])

9. Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries (Art. 33, NCC)

10. Neglect of Duty by Police Officers (Art. 34, NCC)

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EXTINCTION OF CIVIL ACTION AFTER ACCUSED HAS BEEN ACQUITTED

The rule is that “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the court might arise did not exist.” This provision means that the acquittal of the accused for the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgement that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Here it is true that Julio Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico were acquitted, the court holding that they were not responsible for the fire that destroyed the house of the plaintiff, - which as a rule will not necessarily extinguish their civil liability, - but the court went further by stating that the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused cannot be held responsible. In our opinion, this declaration fits well into the exception rule which exempts the two accused from civil liability. When the court acquitted the accused because the fire was due to an unfortunate accident, it actually said that the fire was due to a fortuitous event for which the accused are not to blame. It actually exonerated them from civil liability. (Anita Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil. 672 [1952])

EFFECT OF DEATH OF THE ACCUSED TO CIVIL LIABILITY

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. (People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239 [1994])

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

The mere fact that thee are actions to annul the marriages entered itno by the accused in a bigamy case does not mes that « prejudicial questions » are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of amrriage be considered prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage must be one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for bigamy.

The situation in the given case is markedly different since at te time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that the two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And, it was the second spouse , not the petitioner, who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Moreover, it was only after the filing of the criminal case for bigamy that the petitioner, as defendant in the civil action filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging the his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threat and intimidation.

Assuming that the first marriage was null and void, tat fact would nt be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves it nullity, for the same must be submitted tot he judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no sich declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the rick of being prosecuted for bigamy. (Landicho vs. Relova, 22 Phil 731)

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A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case

Pursuant to Landicho doctrine, petitioner cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belied by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity. (Donato vs. Luna 160 SCRA 441)

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There is no need for petitoner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the maaariage will not be void but merely voidable, adn therefore, valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear thet when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequenlty, her marriage to respondent is VOID. (Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499)
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The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. (Beltran vs. People, June 20, 2000)