Sunday, February 28, 2010

Another Blog

I found another blog:

http://lexforiphilippines.com/

It also provides digested cases for law students. Please do check it out!!!

Monday, February 22, 2010

Stress Relief: Six Quick Mental Trips

e-mailed by Ms. Celine Marcelo

Visualizing a stress-free place and other relaxation techniques are quick and easy ways to help your whole body calm down and give you just the boost you need to get on with your day. Connolly suggests these six ways for you to slip away on a mental vacation to reduce stress:
  1. Read a book in bed. Connolly says this is a great escape and can leave you feeling refreshed, relaxed, and ready to face whatever is outside your bedroom door. Your bed is warm, cozy, comfortable, and a peaceful place for you. It feels luxurious, and getting lost in a good book is a perfect way to forget, then refocus, your own thoughts.
  2. Visualize relaxation. Steal a few quiet moments to close your eyes and think of an image that relaxes you — such as the warm sun on your skin and the sound of the ocean, a big country field sprinkled with flowers, or a trickling stream. Connolly suggests thinking back to a time when you felt peaceful and relaxed, and focus on releasing the tension from your toes to your head.
  3. Look at pictures from a happy time. Connolly recommends pulling out snapshots from a photo album of a family vacation or a fun dinner with friends. Reflect on your memories of that occasion, and what made it so enjoyable. Spend a few quiet moments reminiscing, and you'll find yourself more relaxed.
  4. Look out a window. Distract yourself by focusing on something other than what's stressing you. Grab a steaming cup of coffee or tea, close the door, and take a mental break. Do a little people watching, appreciate any birds within view, or enjoy some fluffy clouds rolling by. Allow yourself to daydream for a few minutes.
  5. Listen to a relaxation CD. Invest in a couple of these CDs for a short daily escape, says Connolly. You may like to hear chirping birds, rolling waves, or gentle rain — whatever your choice, closing your eyes and listening to these soothing sounds while doing some deep breathing can help you relax and de-stress.
  6. Take a walk. Exercise is a great way to relieve stress because it's a great escape for your mind. Head out for a quiet early morning walk or lace up your sneakers on your lunch break. Walking along a trail, waterfront, or other peaceful place when possible may offer even more relaxation.

Treat yourself to a 5-, 10-, or 20-minute mental vacation each day and train your body to relax and reduce stress — you'll be amazed at how much better you feel after taking just a few luxurious moments all to yourself.

Saturday, February 20, 2010

Pimentel v. HRET, Nov. 29, 2002

Facts: On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including petitioners from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties.

Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA. From available records, it does not appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties.

On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In its meeting of January 20, 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno.

On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. Petitioners contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. Petitioners charge that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of February 8, 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of G.R. No. 141490 with G.R. No. 141489.

On February 11, 2000, petitioners filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions.

Senator Pimentel filed the instant petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.

In their Reply to Consolidated Comment, petitioners alleged that, following the Solicitor General’s computation, the LP and LAKAS were over-represented in the HRET and the CA. Petitioners particularly assail the presence of one LP representative each in the HRET and the CA, and maintain that the LP representatives should be ousted and replaced with nominees of the 14 party-list representatives.

Issues: 1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE HRET.

2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE IN THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA.

3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF THE HRET AND THE CA TO RECONSTITUTE THEMSELVES TO INCLUDE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for prohibition and mandamus are DISMISSED.

Ratio Decidendi: The court cannot resolved the issue because it is a well-settled rule that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry concur: (1) there must be an actual controversy; (2) the person or party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in the resolution of the controversy; (3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable to the final determination of the controversy.

Finally, the issues raised in the petitions have been rendered academic by subsequent events. On May 14, 2001, a new set of district and party-list representatives were elected to the House. The Court cannot now resolve the issue of proportional representation in the HRET and the CA based on the "present composition" of the House of Representatives as presented by petitioners and the Solicitor General. With the May 14, 2001 elections, it is certain that the composition of the House has changed.

Saturday, February 13, 2010

House vs dela Costa, G.R. No. L-46534, October 16, 1939

Facts: The petitioner, plaintiff in a civil case against C.P. Bush and George Upton for the recovery of a sum of money, obtained a preliminary attachment of certain properties of the latter. Three days thereafter, Bush and Upton secured the discharge of the attachment of these properties by filing a bond posted by Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., on August 25, 1934, for P2,000, the condition of the bond being that, should the plaintiff and petitioner House obtain a judgment against C.P. Bush, the latter would return to the Sheriff of Manila the properties discharged from attachment and, should he fail to do so, the Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., would pay the value thereof.

On September 1st following, the petitioner House and C.P. Bush entered into an agreement, without the knowledge or consent of the Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., whereby Bush delivered to the petitioner, together with other properties, those discharged from attachment to be sold at public auction. The petitioner was the highest bidder in this sale and the properties were adjudicated to him.

Eventually the petitioner obtained judgment against C.P .Bush for the amount of P2,000 and the same not having been satisfied, he asked for execution against Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., as surety of C.P Bush in the discharge of the properties from the attachment. The court denied this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the court exceeded and abused its discretion in so ruling.

Held: No. From the foregoing it appears that the petitioner and C.P. Bush, under the agreement of September 1st, substantially altered their judicial relations as to the properties discharged from attachment and for the delivery of which Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., was a surety, which alteration necessity released the latter from its obligations as such surety. The properties discharged from attachment having been turned over to the petitioner and thereafter publicly sold and adjudicated to him under the said agreement, the obligation of C.P. Bush to return the properties to the Sheriff, in satisfaction of the judgment in favor of the petitioner, was extinguished and compliance therewith became impossible by petitioner's own act, thereby resulting in the release of the surety from its obligation to pay the value of said properties.

Ibarra vs Aveyro, G.R. No. L-11306, December 6, 1917

Facts: On April 10, 1915, counsel for Alejandro Ibarra filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against Leopoldo Aveyro and Emiliano Pre, for the purpose of recovering from them jointly and severally the sum of P465 as principal, besides such additional sum as might be found owing in accordance with the penal clause of the contract, at the rate of P5 a day from the date of the maturity of the obligation, which was December 5, 1914, until its complete payment, together with the costs of the trial, inasmuch as, on November 30, 1914, the defendants by means of a promissory note subscribed by both of them, borrowed from the plaintiff the sum of P465 under promise to return it to him on December 4th following, with the understanding that in a contrary case they should be obliged to pay him P5 for each day of delinquency in the payment of the said principal. The defendants deny all the allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense set forth that on March 28, 1914, the defendant Leopoldo Aveyro sold to the plaintiff a piece of land with the right of repurchase, for the sum of P450; that subsequently, this defendant borrowed from the plaintiff the title deed of the land sold, for the purpose of selling the property to another person at a better price, and afterwards returned the deed to the plaintiff as he had been unsuccessful in making such attempted second sale; that on November 30 of the same year the defendant Aveyro, feeling sure that this time he would be able to sell his land to another, borrowed from the plaintiff for the third time said deed of the land, and that then the latter required Aveyro to execute in the plaintiff's favor a promissory note, with the security of a solvent surety, for the same sum for which this defendant had to sold the land to the plaintiff, and with the aforementioned penal clause, to be effective in case of delinquency in the payment of said amount should the defendant succeed in selling the property, and with the condition that, if the sale should not be made, the borrowed deed should be returned; that as the defendant was unable to sell the land, he tried to return the deed to his creditor, requiring of course the return of the promissory note he had given in security for the deed, but that the plaintiff refused to accept the deed and return the promissory note. The court rendered a judgment, on August 18, 1915, by ordering Leopoldo Aveyro and Emiliano Pre to pay to the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P465 with legal interest thereon from December 5, 1915, until its complete payment; and by holding that the penal clause for the payment of P5 for each day's delinquency in the payment of the principal debt is null and void because it is immoral, pursuant to article 1255 of the Civil Code and to other legal provisions.

Issue: Whether the plaintiff has a right to demand that the defendants pay the penalty specified in the obligation to pay P5 per day from December 5, 1914, until complete reimbursement of the outstanding principal for delinquency in the payment of said principal to the plaintiff.

Held: Notwithstanding the imprudence and temerity shown by the defendants by their execution of a ruinous engagement, assumed, as it appears, knowingly and voluntarily, morality, and justice cannot consent to and sanction a repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the common sense of man; and therefore, as all acts performed against the provisions of law are null and void, and as the penal clause referred to, notwithstanding its being an ostensible violation of morals, was inserted in said promissory note, we must conclude that the contracting party favored by said penal clause totally lacks all right of action to enforce its fulfillment.

Reyes vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-32226, December 29, 1930

Facts: This action was instituted on March 18, 1927, in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna by Estanislao Reyes against the Martinez heirs upon four several causes of action in which the plaintiff seeks, first, to recover five parcels of land, containing approximately one thousand coconut trees and to obtain a declaration of ownership in his own favor as against the defendants with respect to said parcels; secondly, to recover from the defendants the sum of P9,377.50, being the alleged proceeds of some 1,860 coconut trees which, prior to July 31, 1926, had been applied to the benefit of said defendants; thirdly, to recover from the defendants the sum of P43,000, as the alleged value of the proceeds of the lands involved in the receivership in the case of Martinez vs. GraƱo, G. R. No. 27685, to which the plaintiff supposes himself to be entitled, but which have gone, so he claims, to the benefit of the defendants in said receivership; and fourthly, to recover the sum of P10,000 from the defendants as damages resulting from their improper meddling in the administration of the receivership property. From this judgment both parties appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the claim of the dependant can be conceded.

Held: In view of the conclusion reached in Martinez vs. GraƱo (51 Phil., 287), as well as in view of the solution reached in the case now before us, the claim of the defendants, as appellants, to the interest on the sum of P8,000 from July 31, 1926, cannot be conceded, as the judgment itself bears interest at the lawful rate from the date the same was rendered.


Monday, February 8, 2010

Floriano vs Delgado, 11 Phil 154, August 27, 1908

Facts: On February 17, 1907, Floriano filed a complaint against Delgado and Bertumen, alleging that the latter were indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P1,352.80, who engaged to pay it together with interest at the rate of ten percent per annum, as appears in their promissory note on January 20, 1907. The said amount was not paid, not withstanding demand. Thus constitute this case.

Issue: Whether or not the obligation contracted by both parties are pure obligation.

Held: Yes. In accordance with the old laws in force in the Islands prior to the enactment of the present Civil Code, when an obligation is pure, simple and unconditional and no particular day has been fixed for its fulfillment payment payment of the same may be demanded ten days after it is contracted.

Hermosa vs Longara, G. R. No. L-5267, October 27, 1953

Facts: There are three kinds of claims occured after the death of the intestate in December, 1944. The claimant presented evidence and the CA found that the intestate has asked for the said credit advances for himself and for the members of his family "on condition that their payment should be made by Fernando Hermosa, Sr. as soon as he received funds derived from the sale of his property in Spain." CA held that payment of the advances did not become due until the administratrix recieved the sum of P20,000 from the buyer of the property. Upon authorization of the probate court in October, 1997. and the same was paid for subsequently. Thus constitute this appeal.

Issue: Whether the obligation contracted by the intestate was subject to a condition exclusively dependent upon the will of the debtor and therefore null and void.

Held:
The obligation contracted is a suspensive condition, upon the happening of which the obligation to pay is made dependent. And upon the happening of the condition, the debt became immediately due and demandable.

Chua Gui Seng vs. General Sales Supply Co. Inc., G. R. No. L-3974, April 28, 1952

Facts: Chua Gui Seng leased to the General Sales Supply Co. Inc., for a term of one year from June 1, 1948, at a monthly rental of P1,500 payable within the first five days of each month. Due to the failure of the defendant to pay the monthly rentals, Atty. Jesus B. Santos, as counsel for the plainiff appellant, wrote a letter dated Oct. 8, 1948, offering the defendant to pay back the rentals within 15 days to be able to continue the lease. On Oct. 18, 1948, the plaintiff filed in the Municipal Court a complaint for ejectment which was later on affirmed by the said court. The defendant filed an appeal to the CFI of Manila but later on dismissed. Thus constitute this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the CFI of Manila erred in dismissing the complaint.

Held: Yes. The appealed decision is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellee is ordered to pay the plaintiff-appellant the sum of P3,000 as back rentals, without interest, to which one-half of the deposit of P3,000 may be applied, the other half being declared forfeited.

Sunday, February 7, 2010

Llamas vs Abaya, 60 Phil 502

digested by Ms. Iola Vianka Pinon

Facts: A judgment was rendered by the CFI against the defendant. While there was a pending appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant through a letter to the plaintiff tendered payment for the sum of P5,933.30 with accrued interest, he also stated that he formally accrued interest subsequent to the date of his letter. The judgment of the lower court was favorable to the Plaintiff with a larger amount, so the latter ignored the defendant's letter. But the said decision was reversed and the defendant was ordered to pay the amount mentioned in his letter which he deposited over a year after his letter tendering payment to the clerk of court.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant was relieved from payng further interests from the date of his letter.

Held: The stipulated interest should accrue, and be payable up to the date on which the principal is paid. The reason for this is that the tender of payment did not have the effect of suspending the interest and its accumulation under the provision of Article 1256 of the Civil Code.

Lee vs Tambago, 544 SCRA 393, February 12, 2008

digested by Ms. Charo L. Bayani

Facts: Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which were also questioned for the unnotated Residence Certificates that are known to be a copy of their respective voter's affidavit. In addition to such, the contested will was executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence Certificate by the Testator dated January 5, 1962, which was never submitted for filing to the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and Arts (NCAA). Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that all allegations are falsely given because he allegedly exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regards to the provision of existing law and had complied with elementary formalities in the performance of his duties and that the complaint was filed simply to harass him based on the result of a criminal case against him in the Ombudsman that did not prosper. However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to the Archives Division of NCAA. In resolution, the court referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which was affirmed with modification against the respondent and in favor of the complainant.

Issue:
Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a violation in Notarial Law and the Ethics of Legal Profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament?

Held:
Yes. As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is guilty of professional misconduct as he violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01nof the Code of Professional Responsibility, Article 806 of the Civil Code and provision of the Notarial Law. Thus, Atty. Tambago is suspended from the practice of law for one year and his Notarial commission revoked. In addition, because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is perpetually disqualified from reappointments as a Notary Public.

Wong vs. Moya II, A. C. No. 6972, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 256

Facts: Complainant is the owner of J & L Agro-vets. Sometime in 1997, he retained the services of respondent. As their relationship prospered, respondent asked financial help from complainant for the construction of his house and purchase of a car on installment basis from Transfarm. Wherein, the complainant willingly helped him. He issued postdated checks to cover its payment to Transfarm. The respondent in turn issued checks in favor of the complainant to reimburse the latter but the checks issued were dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.” Respondent refused to comply with the repeated demands of the complainant to replace the dishonored checks.

Further, the respondent failed to pay Quirino Tomlin, the owner of Unisia Merchandising Corporation, from whom respondent obtained construction materials in the amount of P164,000.00.The said failure to pay indebtedness, caused embarrassment to complainant because he is the one who introduced the respondent to Tomlin.

Furthermore, On August 15, 2001, Berting Diwa paid the amount of P15,680.50 for the satisfaction of the judgment on Civil Case No. 1482 in favor of the complainant. As complainant’s counsel, respondent received the payment but he did not inform complainant about it. Thus, constitute this disbarment case before IBD-CBD.

On April 27, 2005, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year for his failure to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several occasions and to appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer and that pending criminal cases filed against him in court does not pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the disbarment case. The recommendation was later on approved by the IBP Board of Governors with some modification that he was ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years with a notification that this suspension of two (2) years must be served in succession and that he violated B.P. 22 and for his failure and refusal to comply with his obligations.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Board of Governors of the IBP erred in recommending respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years for having allegedly failed to file his answer on the complaint for disbarment despite due notice.

2. Whether or not the Board of Governors of IBP erred in recommending respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years for having allegedly violated B. P. 22, otherwise known as the bouncing checks law.

3. Whether or not the Board of Governors of IBP erred in recommending respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years for having allegedly refused to settle his obligations.

Held:

1. No. His conduct in the course of the IBP proceedings in this case is also a matter of serious concern. He submitted a motion to dismiss after requesting several extensions of time to file his answer. His failure to attend the hearings and belated plea to dismiss the case, despite orders to the contrary, show a callous disregard of the lawful orders of the duly constituted authority, which caused undue delay in the IBP proceeding. This conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyer’s oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice.

2. No. The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in the legal profession. Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.

3. No. persistent refusal to settle due obligations despite demand manifests a lawyer’s low regard to his commitment to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem. This conduct deserves nothing less than a severe disciplinary action.