haPPY nEW yEAR!!!

BLOG

I would like to share to everyone the blog that I always consulted for digested cases last semester:

http://berneguerrero.com/node/82

I'm sure this blog will also be a big help for you!!!

Municipal Board of Canvassers of Glan vs. COMELEC, 414 SCRA 273 (2000)

Digested by: Ms. Araceli B. Gloria

Facts: A pre-proclaimed controversy instituted by respondent Flora Benzonan and COMELEC, Benzonan who was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Glan, Sarangani during 2001 sought to declare null and void the canvass conducted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Glan and to recall the proclamation of petitioners respectively. Respondent argued here a pre-proclamation case on the ground that:

a. After the original and second municipal Board of Canvassers had resigned, the third Municipal Board of Canvassers was illegally constituted as its chairman, Vice Chairman and Secretary which are not qualified under the Omnibus Code.

b. The canvassing proceeding with more initially held in the Session Hall of Sangguniang Bayan were latter transferred to the Provincial Capitol of Danao contrary to COMELEC Resolution.

c. The Secretary of Municipal Board of Canvassers failed to record the minutes of canvassing.

d. Neither Benzonan nor her representatives were the last three days of canvassing proceeding.

e. A substantial number of election returns had been tampered with of falsificated.

f. Municipal Board of Canvassers falsificated the Certificate of Canvass Vote.

The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution finding the based on the evidence presented the proclamation of the winning candidates were declared null and void. And a re-canvass of the election returns was ordered. Arising from the said decision was a petition for Certiorari filed to review the COMELEC en banc’s resolution and praying that a Temporary Restraining Order be given for the reason that COMELEC was not in the proper jurisdiction to render such resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc has a jurisdiction over the case.

Held: Not all cases relating to election laws filed before the COMELEC are required to be first heard by a division. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC exercise both administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of quasi-judicial powers are involved that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division. It is clear that this case is one that involves a pre-proclamation controversy that requires the exercise of the composition and proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Also, Benzonan filed her pre-proclamation case directly with the COMELEC en banc. Since COMELEC en banc is without jurisdiction to decide cases involving such, the procedure taken by Benzonan resulted in a resolution in her favor thus declare null and void.

Matsura vs. COMELEC, 285 SCRA 443

Digested by Ms. Araceli B. Gloria

Facts: Petitioner Michael Matsura and private respondent Didagen Dilanggalen were congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao. Dilanggalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the same was allegedly tampered. The COMELEC ordered the production and examination of election returns of the Municipality of Matanog. During the examination four (4) ballot boxes were produced and opened. Upon the examination and comparison the CEMELEC found that indeed the certificate had been tampered. Meanwhile, the Municipal Board of Canvassers convened and re-canvasses the votes. Matsura objected the inclusion of fifty (50) out of fifty-seven (57) election returns on the ground that the COMELEC copy of election returns was not reflective of the true results unless compared with the copy of the original of Municipal Board of Canvassers. Matsura thereafter walked out while the new Municipal Board of Canvassers continued with the canvassing. After the proceedings, private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected member and Maguindanao. Matsura filed a petition for Certiorari; prohibition and Mandamus praying the annulment of said decision due to grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC exercise a grave abuse of discretion by not including the seven (7) remaining election returns for the re-canvassing of votes.

Held: No, the COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether mere existence of a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Once the election returns were found to be falsificated or tampered with the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns.

merry xmas!!!

another from Atty. Daye

This is another legal info posted by Atty. Daye Tolentino last July 15, 2008

Preliminaries to the 1950 Civil Code

Effectivity of Laws
1. As to the period with respect to publication (Art.2)
General Rule (GR): Laws take effect after 15 days following the completion of its publication
Exception (XPN): unless {specific period} otherwise provided but always after publication

As a rule, laws take effect at the 16th day because the law says, “after 15 days”
Publication cannot be dispensed with for to do so would be a violation of due process. It must also be in its entirety since the purpose is to inform the public of the substance of the law.

2. As to operation with respect to date of promulgation
GR: Laws have no retroactive effect
XPNS:(PIC RETRO)
1. Penal laws favorable to the accused
2. Interpretative Statutes
3. Curative Statutes
4. Laws creating new Rights
5. Emergency Laws
6. Tax laws
7. Remedial/procedural
8. Unless the law Otherwise provides

Ø XPNS to the XPNS:(IE) constitutional limits, where retroactivity would result to
1. Impairment of obligation of contracts
2. Ex Post Facto Laws

“Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.”
- the “laws” referred to are domestic mandatory or prohibitory laws
Mistake of Fact- when some facts which really exist are unknown or some fact is supposed to exist which really does not exist.
- excusable, if in good faith

Mistake of Law- occurs when a person having full knowledge of the facts come to an erroneous conclusion as to its legal effects
-not excusable, even if in good faith

Waiver of Rights
GR: allowed (Art. 6)
XPNS: if waiver is
1. contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs
2. prejudicial to a third party with a right recognized by law

Requisites of Waiver of Rights (EKI)
1. Existence of a right
2. Knowledge of the existence of a right
3. Intention to relinquish the right

Note: When an act is both a right and a duty, there can be no waiver.

Interpretation of Laws
1. Stare decisis (Art. 8)
2. periods – day = 24 hours, month = 30 days, year = 365 days, if month is specified = actual number of days.
3. Customs must be proven as a fact under the Rules of Evidence
4. Legislative intent for justice to prevail

Applicability of Laws
1. Penal Laws and laws of public security/safety
GR: Territoriality Rule governs (Art. 14)
XPN: Treaty stipulations, Public International Law principles

2. Laws on persons’ family rights/duties, to the status, condition and legal capacity
GR: Nationality Rule applies (Art. 15)
XPN: 1. When marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Art 26, FC);
2. Domiciliary rule supplants the nationality rule in cases involving stateless persons

3. Laws on Property
GR: Lex Rei Sitae applies (Art 16)
XPN: Testate/Intestate Succession as to 3 things only:
1. order of succession
2. amount of successional rights
3. intrinsic validity (testate only)

4. Laws on forms and solemnities of contracts, will and public documents
GR: Lex loci celebrationis applies(Art 17)
XPNS:
1. execution before Philippine diplomatic/consular officials – Philippine laws
2. prohibitive laws which cannot be rendered ineffective:
Ex. a. void marriages under Art 35, FC.
b. joint wills never valid in RP
' What laws govern he making of wills?
As to extrinsic validity (form)- Art 17
As to intrinsic validity (Art 16)

Rules on Personal Law
DOMICILIARY RULE
The basis for determining personal law of an individual is the domicile
NATINALITY RULE
The basis for determining the personal law of an individual is his citizenship

Ø Renvoi Doctrine
Where the conflict rules of the forum refer to a foreign law, and the latter refers it back to the forum, the internal law of the forum applies.
(If the foreign law refers it to a third country, the said country’s law governs. This is referred to as the transmission theory).

Ø Doctrine of Processual Presumption
The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.

from Atty. Daye

This is an article posted by my ever beautiful professor in undergrad Atty. Daye Tolentino in her blog 'Dayedalera' last year July 22, 2008. Here is the site so that you can check it out:

http://anneclaudette.blogspot.com/

HUMAN RELATIONS

1. Principle of Abuse of Rights (Art. 19, NCC)

Elements:
(a) Legal right or duty
(b) The right or duty is exercised in bad faith, and
(c) For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

ABUSE OF RIGHT

Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student’s grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course. (University of the East vs. Romeo A. Jader, GR. No. 132344 [2000])

For the pivotal factor rendering Philamgen and the other private respondents liable in damages is that the termination by them of the General Agency Agreement was tainted with bad faith. Hence, if a principal acts in bad faith and with abuse of right in terminating the agency, then he is liable in damages. This is in accordance with the precepts of Human Relations enshrined in our Civil Code that every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith (Art. 19, Civil Code), and every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damages to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same (Art. 20, Civil Code). (Arturo P. Valenzuela, et al. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., GR. No. 83122 [1990])

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfil that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. (Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Marilou T. Gonzales, GR. No. 97336 [1993])


SEDUCTION

The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter’s family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affair reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese National. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through cleaver strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code. (Cecilio Pe, et al. vs. Alfonso Pe, GR. No. L-17396 [1962])


2. General Sanction (Art. 20, NCC)
Speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction

Elements:
(a) In the exercise of his legal right or duty
(b) Willfully or negligently causes damage to another

3. Acts Contra Bonus Mores (Art. 21, NCC)

Elements:
(a) There is an act which is legal
(b) But which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy
(c) And it is done with intent to injure

PUBLIC HUMILIATION

The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Private respondent has to take full responsibility for his act and his claim that he was unaware of what he had done to petitioner because of drunkenness is definitely no excuse and does not relieve him of his liability to the latter. (Rafael Patricio vs. The Honorable Oscar Leviste, GR. No. 51832 [1989])

We do not lay down here any hard-and-fast rule as to what act or combination of acts constitute the crime of shoplifting for it must be stressed that each case must be considered and adjudged on a case-to-case basis and that in the determination of whether a person suspected of shoplifting has in truth and in fact committed the same, all the attendant facts and circumstances should be considered in their entirety and not from any single fact or circumstance from which to impute the stigmata of shoplifting on any person suspected and apprehended therefor.

Upon the facts and under the law, plaintiff has clearly made the cause of action for damages against the defendants. Defendants wilfully caused loss or injury to plaintiff in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, making them amenable to damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. That private respondent was falsely accused of shoplifting is evident. (Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs. Jose J. Espino, Jr., GR. No. L-48250 [1979])


4. Violation of Right of Privacy, Family Relations, Vexation and Humiliation (Art. 26, NCC)

5. Dereliction of Official Duty of Public Officers (Art. 27, NCC)

Requisites:
(a) defendant is a public officer charged with the performance of a duty in favor of the plaintiff
(b) he refused or neglected without just cause to perform such duty (ministerial)
(c) plaintiff sustained material or moral loss as consequence of such non-performance
(d) the amount of such damages, if material

6. Unfair Competition (Art. 28, NCC)

7. Malicious Prosecution
Action for damages brought by one against another whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceedings has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or proceeding in favor of the defendant therein

Elements:
(a) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal
(b) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause
(c) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice

8. Violation of Rights and Liberties of Another Person (Art. 32, NCC)

VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT AGAINST SEARCHES AND SEIZURE

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safe guards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. (Rogelio Aberca, et al. vs. Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., GR. No. L-69866 [1988])

9. Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries (Art. 33, NCC)

10. Neglect of Duty by Police Officers (Art. 34, NCC)

* * * * *

EXTINCTION OF CIVIL ACTION AFTER ACCUSED HAS BEEN ACQUITTED

The rule is that “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the court might arise did not exist.” This provision means that the acquittal of the accused for the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgement that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Here it is true that Julio Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico were acquitted, the court holding that they were not responsible for the fire that destroyed the house of the plaintiff, - which as a rule will not necessarily extinguish their civil liability, - but the court went further by stating that the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused cannot be held responsible. In our opinion, this declaration fits well into the exception rule which exempts the two accused from civil liability. When the court acquitted the accused because the fire was due to an unfortunate accident, it actually said that the fire was due to a fortuitous event for which the accused are not to blame. It actually exonerated them from civil liability. (Anita Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil. 672 [1952])

EFFECT OF DEATH OF THE ACCUSED TO CIVIL LIABILITY

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. (People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239 [1994])

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

The mere fact that thee are actions to annul the marriages entered itno by the accused in a bigamy case does not mes that « prejudicial questions » are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of amrriage be considered prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage must be one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for bigamy.

The situation in the given case is markedly different since at te time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that the two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And, it was the second spouse , not the petitioner, who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Moreover, it was only after the filing of the criminal case for bigamy that the petitioner, as defendant in the civil action filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging the his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threat and intimidation.

Assuming that the first marriage was null and void, tat fact would nt be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves it nullity, for the same must be submitted tot he judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no sich declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the rick of being prosecuted for bigamy. (Landicho vs. Relova, 22 Phil 731)

* * * * *

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case

Pursuant to Landicho doctrine, petitioner cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belied by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity. (Donato vs. Luna 160 SCRA 441)

* * * * *

There is no need for petitoner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the maaariage will not be void but merely voidable, adn therefore, valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear thet when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequenlty, her marriage to respondent is VOID. (Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499)
* * * * *

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. (Beltran vs. People, June 20, 2000)

Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415

This digested case came from the blog of Mr. Richard Renes entitled "Stories from a not-yet-Atty." You may also check his blog for more information, here's the site:

http://notyetatty.wordpress.com/

Facts: Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section I of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. Petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the province. Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his district.

On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the sub-province of Biliran became a regular province. The consequence was to reduce the Third District to five (5) municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.

On December 29, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte. The composition of the First District which includes the municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the Fifth District were not disturbed.

In this petition, petitioner insists that Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality of representation ordained in the Constitution.

The intervenor, however, opposed the petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2) assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed its own Comment alleging that it acted within the parameters of the Constitution.

COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled “Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area.”

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Held: COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section I of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.

The issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner’s remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion.

reading books

I'm very glad to post my very first tip on how to survive law school!!!

According to Sir Benny, a member of the College of Law faculty, to be able to survive law school 

"a student must read not less that 380 pages per day"

this information was handed to him by one of the prominent professor in Law School!

Tan vs. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 353, October 4, 1994

digested by Ms. Iola Vianka M. Pi non

Facts: On May 10, 1992, the petitioner, as an incumbent City Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the COMELEC as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers in the said area for the May 11, 1992, synchronized national and local elections conformably with the provisions of Section 20 (a) of Republic Act 6646 and Section 221 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a Congressional seat to represent the 2nd District of Davao City. Alterado, the private respondent, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation. The cases filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the Office of the Ombudsman was dismissed. What is still pending is an administrative charge, against the Board of Canvassers and herein petitioner for “Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence, and Acts Inimical to the Service”, instituted in the COMELEC.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction to take action on the administrative case when in fact the petitioner as a City prosecutor is under the Administrative jurisdiction.

Held: The COMELEC’s authority under Section 2 (6-8), Article 9 of the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters, also Section 52, Article 7 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner is in relation to the performance of his duties as an Election canvasser and not as a City Prosecutor. The COMELEC’s mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate suspension and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national and local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of the process to the official or employee concerned.

Poe vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 454 SCRA 242, March 29, 2005

Facts: On June 24, 2004, the Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people and acting as the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) as the duly elected President of the Philippines. She obtained the highest votes, followed by  the second-placer, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She then took her Oath of Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.

Refusing to concede defeat, Mr. FPJ, filed an election protest before the Electoral Tribunal. Both parties exchanged motions to rush the presentation of their respective positions on the controversy. Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant on December 14, 2004, his counsel has submitted to the Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005, a "MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ," by the widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe. She claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not only of her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004 elections. 

Issue:

1.        Who between the Protestant and the Protestee was the true winner in the May 10, 2004 Presidential Elections

2.        Whether or not the Protestant’s widow could intervene and/or substitute for the deceased party. 

Held: WHEREFORE, the motion of movant/intervenor JESUSA SONORA POE a.k.a. SUSAN ROCES to intervene and substitute for the deceased protestant is DENIED for lack of merit.

Acting on the protest and considering the Notice of the Death, submitted by counsel of protestant RONALD ALLAN POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., we also resolve that Presidential Electoral Tribunal Case No. 002, entitled Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, should be as it is hereby DISMISSED on the ground that no real party in interest has come forward within the period allowed by law, to intervene in this case or be substituted for the deceased protestant.

Badelles vs. Cabili, 27 SCRA 11, February 27, 1969

Facts: Mariano Badelles together with Bonifacio P. Legaspi and Cecilia T. Barazon who along with the five protestees  were among those who were registered candidates voted for in such election for councilors in the City of Iligan, who contested the election of Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office of City Mayor of the said city.

It was then alleged that there are irregularities on the said election and that illegal votes were cast by those not qualified to do so. Protestees moved to dismiss in different suits the petition on the following grounds:

1. That the protest was filed beyond the reglementary period allowed by the Revised Election Code;

2. That the lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case, the Commission on Elections being the proper body to hear the same;

3. That the complaint states no cause of action.

         On march 23, 1968, in a single order, the election protests were dismissed based on the lack of a cause of action.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal issued by COMELEC on March 23, 1968 is valid.

Held: No. The election law has no justification except as a means for assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that corruption and irregularities should not be permitted to taint the electoral process.