Arco Metal Products vs. SAMARM-NAFLU

Arco Metal Products vs. SAMARM-NAFLU

G.R. No. 170734 May 14, 2008

Facts: Petitioner is a company engaged in the manufacture of metal products, whereas respondent is the labor union of petitioner’s rank and file employees. Sometime in December 2003, petitioner paid the 13^th month pay, bonus, and leave encashment of three union members in amounts proportional to the service they actually rendered in a year, which is less than a full twelve (12) months. The employees were Rante Lamadrid, Alberto Gamban, and Rodelio Collantes. Respondent protested the prorated scheme, claiming that on several occasions petitioner did not prorate the payment of the same benefits to seven (7) employees who had not served for the full 12 months. The payments were made in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003, and 2004. According to respondent, the prorated payment violates the rule against diminution of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code. Thus, they filed a complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The parties submitted the case for voluntary arbitration. The voluntary arbitrator, Apron M. Mangabat, ruled in favor of the petitioner.

Issue/s: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the grant of 13^th month pay, bonus, and leave encashment in full regardless of actual service rendered constitutes voluntary employer practice and, consequently, the prorated payment of the said benefits does not constitute diminution of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code.

Whether the intent of the CBA provisions is to grant full benefits regardless of service actually rendered by an employee to the company.

Held: IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85089 dated 29 September 2005 is and its Resolution dated 9 December 2005 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Ratio Decidendi: The Petition fails.

In cases involving money claims of employees, the employer has the burden of proving that the employees did receive the wages and benefits and that the same were paid in accordance with law. Indeed, if petitioner wants to prove that it merely erred in giving full benefits, it could have easily presented other proofs, such as the names of other employees who did not fully serve for one year and thus were given prorated benefits. Experientially, a perfect attendance in the workplace is always the goal but it is seldom achieved. There must have been other employees who had reported for work less than a full year and who, as a consequence received only prorated benefits. This could have easily bolstered petitioner’s theory of mistake/error, but sadly, no evidence to that effect was presented.

Magallanes vs. Sun Yat Sen

Magallanes vs. Sun Yat Sen

G.R. No. 160876 January 18, 2008

Facts: Azucena Magallanes, Evelyn Bacolod, Judith Cotecson (represented by her heirs), petitioners, Grace Gonzales, and Bella Gonzales were all employed as teachers in the Sun Yat Sen Elementary School in Surigao City. Paz Go and Elena Cubillan are principals of the said school. Willy Ang Gan Teng and Benito Ang are its directors, while Teotimo Tan is the school treasurer. They are all respondents herein.

On May 22, 1994, respondents terminated the services of petitioners. Thus, on August 3, 1994, they filed with the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. X, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Butuan City, complaints against respondents for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, payment of backwages, 13^th month pay, ECOLA, separation pay, moral damages, and attorney’s fees. Likewise, on August 22, 1994, petitioner Cotecson filed a separate complaint praying for the same reliefs.

Issue: (1) whether the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) erred in holding that affixing a wrong docket number on a motion renders it "non-existent;" and (2) whether the issuance by the NLRC of the Order dated March 30, 2001, amending the amounts of separation pay and backwages, awarded by the Court of Appeals (Sixteenth Division) to petitioners and computed by the Labor Arbiter, is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Held: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The challenged Resolutions dated October 29, 2001, May 8, 2003, and October 10, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67068 are REVERSED. The Order of the NLRC dated March 30, 2001 in NLRC Case No. M-006176-2001 is SET ASIDE. The Order of the Labor Arbiter dated January 8, 2001 is REINSTATED.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) is correct when it ruled that petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated October 29, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67068 is "non-existent." Petitioners’ counsel placed a wrong case number in their motion. Where a pleading bears an erroneous docket number and thus "could not be attached to the correct case," the said pleading is, for all intents and purposes, "non-existent." It has neither the duty nor the obligation to correct the error or to transfer the case to the Seventh Division. However, we opt for liberality in the application of the rules to the instant case in light of the following considerations. First, the rule that negligence of counsel binds the client may be relaxed where adherence thereto would result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property or where the interests of justice so require. Second, this Court is not a slave of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion – in rendering justice; it is guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights. Thus, if the application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within this Court’s power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its application.

2. We sustain petitioners’ contention that the NLRC, in modifying the award of the Court of Appeals, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Quasi-judicial agencies have neither business nor power to modify or amend the final and executory Decisions of the appellate courts. Under the principle of immutability of judgments, any alteration or amendment which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction.⁸ We thus rule that the Order dated March 30, 2001 of the NLRC directing that the monetary award should be computed from June 1994, the date petitioners were dismissed from the service, up to June 20, 1995 only, is void.

The Return

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Please watch out for my upcoming posts!!!

Pormellosa vs. Land Tenure Administration 1 SCRA 375

digested by LLB 1-4 College of Law, Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Facts: The lot in controversy is a part of the Santa Clara Estate on which many families have settled through the consent of its owner, each paid a rental. In May 1941, the said Estate was acquired by the Government & was entrusted to an office known as the Rural Progress Admin., which was later abolished & its functions was transferred to the Bureau of Lands. Recently, such duties was given to the Land Tenure Administration.

The plaintiff acquired by purchase the right of occupation of the lot in question from Vicente San Jose, predecessor-in-interest. After the purchase of the Santa Clara Estate by the Government, the plaintiffs were allowed to make payments on account of the purchase price of the lot, as fenced, included two hundred (200) sq.m. Thereafter, the plaintiffs found out that the lot had been subdivided into two (2) smaller lots, No. 44 and 78. Lot No. 44 had been sold to Hermino Guzman. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint to compel the Director of Lands to execute a Deed of Sale in their favor & declare null and void the Deed of Sale of Lot No. 44, executed in favor of respondent Hemino. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petitioner’s complaint. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to purchase from the Government the lot, allegedly includes 200 sq.m.

Held: The judgment under review was affirmed.

The lot on which San Jose’s house stood had not been specified, nor had the boundaries thereof been mentioned. Significantly, the plaintiff cannot show a contract whereby the Rural Progress Admin., has sold or promised to sell them a lot of 200 sq.m. A party claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent.

Moreover the Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Vicente San Jose in favor of Pornellosa is a mere private document and does not conclusively establish their right to the parcel of land. Acts and contracts which have for their subject the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public document.

Francisco Guttierez Repide vs. Afzetius and Afzetius, 39 Phil. 190

digested by LLB 1-4 College of Law, Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Facts: The subject of specific performance, with reference to its common law and civil law status, is to be considered on this appeal. The particular action is for the specific performance of a contract for the sale and purchase of seal estate.

The plaintiff is the owner of a certain parcel of realty, the defendants made a proposition to the plaintiff for the purchase of this property. The property was to be mortgaged to the plaintiff to rescue the payment of this balance. The plaintiff proceeded to have survey made of the land and to prepare the deed and mortgage. Expenses where incurred for these purposes. The deed was ready when the defendants were notified to appear and sign the same but they failed to this and wrote a letter to plaintiff.

Plaintiff was, and still is, willing to execute the deed in accordance with the terms agreed upon with the defendants. Accordingly, plaintiff, in his action in the court of First Instance of the City of Manila, asked judgment against the defendants condemning them to sign the deed and mortgage to the land in question, and to pay the purchase price stipulated with costs.

Issue: Whether or not the defendants are able to perform the contract is a matter of defense, and there is no special defense on that subject in the answer.

Ruling: The judgment then was in favor of the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint, without prejudice to any other remedy which the plaintiff might have, and without any finding as to the costs.

The plaintiff and appellant bases his argument or articles 1254, 1258, 1278, 1450, and 1279 of the Civil Code. The provisions of the five articles first cited and others that could be mentioned merely tend to corroborate what is self-evident, namely, the existence of a valid contract between the parties. Indisputably, there has been an offer and an acceptance, and all that remained to effectuate the contract was the execution of the deed and the mortgage.

Here we have presented a good and valid contract, bilateral in character, and free from all taint of fraud. The stability or commercial transaction requires that the rights of the seller be protected just as effectively as the right of the buyer. If this plaintiff had refused to comply with the contract, specific performance of the obligation could have been asked by the defendants. Just as surely should the plaintiff who has lived up to his bargain and who has been put to expense to do so, be permitted to coerce the defendant into going through with the contract.

The excuse of the defendants is that they do not now have the money to pay the first installment. In other words, they plead impossibility of performance. The rule of equity jurisprudence in such a case is that mere pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement does not discharge the obligation of the contract, nor does it constitute any defense to a decree for specific performance.

Judgment reversed.

Agcaoili vs. GSIS, 165 SCRA 1

digested by LLB 1-4 College of Law, Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Facts: In this case, appellant GSIS approved an application of the appellee Agcaoli for the purchase of a house and lot in the GSIS Housing Project at Nangka, Marikina, subject to the condition that the latter should forthwith occupy the house, a condition that Agcaoli tried to fulfill but could not because the house was absolutely uninhabitable. However, Agcaoli ask a homeless friend, a certain Villanueva, to stay in the premises as some sort of watchman, pending completion of the construction of the house.

Agcaoli after paying the first installment and other fees, having thereafter refused to make further payment of other stipulated installments until GSIS had made the house habitable; and appellant having refused to do so, opting instead to cancel the award and demanded the vacation by Agcaoli of the premises; and the latter having sued the GSIS in the Court of First Instance of Manila for specific performance with damages and having obtained a favorable judgment, the cases was appealed by the GSIS.

Issue: Whether or not Agcaoli is entitled for specific performance with damages.

Held: Appeal of GSIS must fail.

There was then a perfected contract of sale between the parties; there had been a meeting of minds upon the purchase by Agcaoli of a determinate house and lot from GSIS at a definite price which is payable in amortizations and from that moment the parties acquired the right to reciprocally demand performance. It was, to be sure, the duty of the GSIS, as seller, to deliver the thing soled in acondition suitable for its enjoyment by the buyer, in other words to deliver the house subject of the contract in a reasonably livable state. This it failed to do.

Since GSIS failed to fulfill its obligation, and was not willing to put the house in a habitable state, it cannot invoke Agcaoli’s suspension of payment as cause to cancel the contract between them. In recipient obligation, neither party incur in delay of the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. Nor may the GSIS succeed in justifying its cancellation of the award by the claim tha Agcaoli had not complied with the condition of occupying the house within three (3) days. The record shows that Agcaoli did try to fulfill the condition.

Finally appellant having caused the ambiguity as the exact prestation of the agreement, the question of interpretation arising therefrom, should be resolved against it.

Padua vs. Robles 66 SCRA 485

digested by LLB 1-4 College of Law, Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Facts: The citation of the case was a negligent act, homicide through reckless imprudence filed to driver Romeo Punzalan and defendants - appellees as subsidiary liable, which give rise to two separate liabilities, namely (1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or so called culpa aquiliana.

Issue:Whether or not that negligent act of Punzalan gives rise to the two separate and independent liabilities.

Held: It is by now settled beyond all cavil as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent act such as that committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and independent kinds of liabilities, (1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana. These two concepts of fault are so distinct from each other that exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other. Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately and independently of each other, although Article 2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission, which means that should there be varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect, only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff has already been ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case only to the excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he has already been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore in the second case. Thus, in the case at bar, inasmuch as Punzalan had already been sentenced to pay the herein petitioners the amounts above-stated, in the subsequent criminal case, he could not be adjudged to pay a higher amount.