Pormellosa vs. Land Tenure Administration 1 SCRA 375

digested by LLB 1-4 College of Law, Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Facts: The lot in controversy is a part of the Santa Clara Estate on which many families have settled through the consent of its owner, each paid a rental. In May 1941, the said Estate was acquired by the Government & was entrusted to an office known as the Rural Progress Admin., which was later abolished & its functions was transferred to the Bureau of Lands. Recently, such duties was given to the Land Tenure Administration.

The plaintiff acquired by purchase the right of occupation of the lot in question from Vicente San Jose, predecessor-in-interest. After the purchase of the Santa Clara Estate by the Government, the plaintiffs were allowed to make payments on account of the purchase price of the lot, as fenced, included two hundred (200) sq.m. Thereafter, the plaintiffs found out that the lot had been subdivided into two (2) smaller lots, No. 44 and 78. Lot No. 44 had been sold to Hermino Guzman. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint to compel the Director of Lands to execute a Deed of Sale in their favor & declare null and void the Deed of Sale of Lot No. 44, executed in favor of respondent Hemino. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petitioner’s complaint. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to purchase from the Government the lot, allegedly includes 200 sq.m.

Held: The judgment under review was affirmed.

The lot on which San Jose’s house stood had not been specified, nor had the boundaries thereof been mentioned. Significantly, the plaintiff cannot show a contract whereby the Rural Progress Admin., has sold or promised to sell them a lot of 200 sq.m. A party claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent.

Moreover the Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Vicente San Jose in favor of Pornellosa is a mere private document and does not conclusively establish their right to the parcel of land. Acts and contracts which have for their subject the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public document.

Francisco Guttierez Repide vs. Afzetius and Afzetius, 39 Phil. 190

digested by LLB 1-4 College of Law, Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Facts: The subject of specific performance, with reference to its common law and civil law status, is to be considered on this appeal. The particular action is for the specific performance of a contract for the sale and purchase of seal estate.

The plaintiff is the owner of a certain parcel of realty, the defendants made a proposition to the plaintiff for the purchase of this property. The property was to be mortgaged to the plaintiff to rescue the payment of this balance. The plaintiff proceeded to have survey made of the land and to prepare the deed and mortgage. Expenses where incurred for these purposes. The deed was ready when the defendants were notified to appear and sign the same but they failed to this and wrote a letter to plaintiff.

Plaintiff was, and still is, willing to execute the deed in accordance with the terms agreed upon with the defendants. Accordingly, plaintiff, in his action in the court of First Instance of the City of Manila, asked judgment against the defendants condemning them to sign the deed and mortgage to the land in question, and to pay the purchase price stipulated with costs.

Issue: Whether or not the defendants are able to perform the contract is a matter of defense, and there is no special defense on that subject in the answer.

Ruling: The judgment then was in favor of the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint, without prejudice to any other remedy which the plaintiff might have, and without any finding as to the costs.

The plaintiff and appellant bases his argument or articles 1254, 1258, 1278, 1450, and 1279 of the Civil Code. The provisions of the five articles first cited and others that could be mentioned merely tend to corroborate what is self-evident, namely, the existence of a valid contract between the parties. Indisputably, there has been an offer and an acceptance, and all that remained to effectuate the contract was the execution of the deed and the mortgage.

Here we have presented a good and valid contract, bilateral in character, and free from all taint of fraud. The stability or commercial transaction requires that the rights of the seller be protected just as effectively as the right of the buyer. If this plaintiff had refused to comply with the contract, specific performance of the obligation could have been asked by the defendants. Just as surely should the plaintiff who has lived up to his bargain and who has been put to expense to do so, be permitted to coerce the defendant into going through with the contract.

The excuse of the defendants is that they do not now have the money to pay the first installment. In other words, they plead impossibility of performance. The rule of equity jurisprudence in such a case is that mere pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement does not discharge the obligation of the contract, nor does it constitute any defense to a decree for specific performance.

Judgment reversed.

Agcaoili vs. GSIS, 165 SCRA 1

digested by LLB 1-4 College of Law, Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Facts: In this case, appellant GSIS approved an application of the appellee Agcaoli for the purchase of a house and lot in the GSIS Housing Project at Nangka, Marikina, subject to the condition that the latter should forthwith occupy the house, a condition that Agcaoli tried to fulfill but could not because the house was absolutely uninhabitable. However, Agcaoli ask a homeless friend, a certain Villanueva, to stay in the premises as some sort of watchman, pending completion of the construction of the house.

Agcaoli after paying the first installment and other fees, having thereafter refused to make further payment of other stipulated installments until GSIS had made the house habitable; and appellant having refused to do so, opting instead to cancel the award and demanded the vacation by Agcaoli of the premises; and the latter having sued the GSIS in the Court of First Instance of Manila for specific performance with damages and having obtained a favorable judgment, the cases was appealed by the GSIS.

Issue: Whether or not Agcaoli is entitled for specific performance with damages.

Held: Appeal of GSIS must fail.

There was then a perfected contract of sale between the parties; there had been a meeting of minds upon the purchase by Agcaoli of a determinate house and lot from GSIS at a definite price which is payable in amortizations and from that moment the parties acquired the right to reciprocally demand performance. It was, to be sure, the duty of the GSIS, as seller, to deliver the thing soled in acondition suitable for its enjoyment by the buyer, in other words to deliver the house subject of the contract in a reasonably livable state. This it failed to do.

Since GSIS failed to fulfill its obligation, and was not willing to put the house in a habitable state, it cannot invoke Agcaoli’s suspension of payment as cause to cancel the contract between them. In recipient obligation, neither party incur in delay of the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. Nor may the GSIS succeed in justifying its cancellation of the award by the claim tha Agcaoli had not complied with the condition of occupying the house within three (3) days. The record shows that Agcaoli did try to fulfill the condition.

Finally appellant having caused the ambiguity as the exact prestation of the agreement, the question of interpretation arising therefrom, should be resolved against it.

Padua vs. Robles 66 SCRA 485

digested by LLB 1-4 College of Law, Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Facts: The citation of the case was a negligent act, homicide through reckless imprudence filed to driver Romeo Punzalan and defendants - appellees as subsidiary liable, which give rise to two separate liabilities, namely (1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or so called culpa aquiliana.

Issue:Whether or not that negligent act of Punzalan gives rise to the two separate and independent liabilities.

Held: It is by now settled beyond all cavil as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent act such as that committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and independent kinds of liabilities, (1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana. These two concepts of fault are so distinct from each other that exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other. Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately and independently of each other, although Article 2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission, which means that should there be varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect, only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff has already been ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case only to the excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he has already been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore in the second case. Thus, in the case at bar, inasmuch as Punzalan had already been sentenced to pay the herein petitioners the amounts above-stated, in the subsequent criminal case, he could not be adjudged to pay a higher amount.

Bernabe Castillo, et al. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., 176 SCRA 591

digested by LLB 1-4 College of Law, Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari where petitioners seek for the renewal of the Court of Appeals decision affirming the dismissal of the Court of First Instance of the complaint for damages filed by petitioners against the respondents Juanito Rosario and Cresencia Rosario.
On May 2, 1965, petitioner Bernabe Castillo (in his own behalf, and in behalf of Serapion Castillo who has since then become deceased, and Eulogio Castillo, his minor child) and Generosa Galang Castillo figured in a vehicular accident with private respondents Juanito Rosario and Cresencia Rosario at Bagac, Villasis, Pangasinan causing injuries to their persons and damages to their respective vehicles.

The parties have their own version of what actually happened on that fateful day. Each party is pointing to the negligence by the other as the proximate cause of the accident.
While the case was pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan file an information dated September 29. 1965 against Juanito Rosario for double physical injuries, double less serious physical injuries, and damage to property thru reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Urdaneta. Rosario was prosecuted and convicted in the criminal case. Castillo then appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision acquitting him from the crime charged on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision on the basis of the testimonies and evidence submitted by the petitioners as well as the records of the case, dismissing the complain of the petitioners against private respondents as well as the counterclaim of private respondents against the petitioners. On January 24, 1973, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which then affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila as it found no negligence committed by Juanito Rosario to warrant an award of damages to the petitioners. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the judgement of acquittal extinguishes civil liability based on the same incident.

Ruling: Yes. The Court of Appeals' findings that the collision was not due to the negligence of Juanito Rosario but Bernabe Castillo's own act of driving was actually the proximate cause of the collision. With such findings and citing the cases Corpus vs Paje, 28 SCRA 1062, 1064, 1067; Faraon vs Priela, 24 SCRA 582, 583; De Soriano vs Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785, 787788; Tan vs Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672, 675, the Court of Appeals exonerated Rosario from the civil liability on the ground that the alleged negligence did not exist.

Petition denied. No pronouncement as to costs.

William Ollendorf vs. Ira Abrahamson, 38 Phil. 585

digested by LLB 1-4 College of Law, Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Facts: Herein plaintiff Ollendorf and defendant Abrahamson made and entered into Contract of Agreement. The first part hereby agrees to employ the defendant and the party of the second obliges himself to work for the plaintiff within the period of two years. Defendant obligates and binds himself to devote his entire time, attention, energies and industry on the promotion of the furtherance of the business and interest of the party. Failure on the said duty shall entitle the plaintiff to discharge and dismiss the defendant. The second part of the contract further binds the party that he will not enter whether directly or indirectly to engage in a similar or competitive business. Under the term of this agreement, the plaintiff left the employment due to illness and went to U.S. After his departure, the defendant returns to Manila as the Manager of the Philippine Underwear Company. Defendant admits that both firms turn out the same class of goods and those they are exported to the same market. However, he alleged that the said contract with the plaintiff was void for it violates the right for free trade.

Issue: Whether or not the contract is void due to the violation of the rights of trade.

Held: No, the contract was not void as constituting an unreasonable restraint of trade. The rule is that the obligations created by contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and must be enforce in accordance with their tenor. The only limitation upon the freedom of contractual agreement is that the facts established shall not contrary to law, morals or public order. The industry of counsel failed to discover direct expression of the legislative which will prohibits such.